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Abstract 
Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) as the third major component of the aviation industry have 
been less of a focus in research than their airline and airport counterparts. In this paper we analyse 
European ANSPs cost structures using a stochastic frontier analysis approach within a Bayesian 
estimation framework in order to incorporate regularity conditions. Our results show that ownership is 
not directly impacting neither the ANSPs cost structures nor their cost efficiencies and that the 
European ANSPs are operating on the increasing return to scale part of the technology, hence 
supporting the choice of ANSPs agglomeration.  
 
Keyword 
Bayesian estimation, stochastic frontier analysis, cost function, air navigation service providers, 
ownership 
  
 
1. Introduction 
Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) are the third major component within the aviation 
industry, connecting the other two components; airlines and airports through their provision of air 
navigation services (ANS) whilst ensuring the safety of operations and the promotion of efficient 
traffic flows. ANSPs are entities providing both air traffic control (ATC) and air navigation services 
(ANS) collectively referred to as air traffic management (ATM) (Oster and Strong, 2007). ANSPs 
offer en-route, approach and aerodrome control air traffic services. Many also offer oceanic ANS and 
some provide services to civil and military aviation. As a result, ANS can account for between five 
and ten percent of airlines operating costs, with delays generating significant costs to the airlines 
(Quendt et al., 2007). Considering this, it is recognised that improvements for the enhancement of 
flight and airspace efficiencies will facilitate significant cost savings within the industry (McDougall 
and Roberts, 2008). Historically, ANSPs have been owned and controlled by their respective 
governments. However, there is a trend towards separation from the government and a 
commercialisation of the ANSP organisations, with many ANSPs world-wide having moved from the 
traditional governmental departments and agencies towards various different organisational forms 
with some degree of commercial focus within their service provision. This is often a result of 
increasing financial constraints faced by governments, increased congestion and outdated equipment 
and facilities. As such within Europe, several ANSPs have undergone institutional reform to become 
commercialised allowing them to generate internal improvements and liberating them from 
governmental budgetary controls which in turn should enable benefits and efficiencies for the airspace 
users. Most ANSPs have already diversified into non-core business activities, with some explicitly 
stating intentions of expanding such activities. As such, it is interesting to determine the impact, if 
any, that the commercialisation, privatisation and resultant non-core business activities may have 
upon the cost-efficiencies which they seek. A number of publications and studies have tried to assess 
the contribution which privatisation and commercialisation can have on the provision of ANS both 
within Europe and world-wide. For example, Lewis and Zolin (2004) undertook a comparative 
analysis of the institutional arrangements for governance of several global ANSPs ascertaining that 
privatisation is directly related to the ANSP’s ability to respond to user needs. They suggest that 
privatisation should lead to the improvement of financial performances, safety and efficiency. Button 
and McDougall (2006) indicate that in the long-term, ANSP commercialisation results in reductions 
in charges levied on customers, achieved through competition. Their study suggests that 
commercialisation often leads to improvements of service portfolios and provides flexibility. Similar 
results are provided in McDougall and Roberts (2008); the authors suggest that ANSP 
commercialisation generally achieves service quality improvements, modernisation of technologies, 
financial stability and high safety levels. When turning the attention towards ANSP cost efficiency, 
few studies have tried to analyse the European air navigation system. EUROCONTROL, a European 
 
regulation body providing member states with guidance to achieving safe, efficient and 
environmentally sound air traffic services,
1
 produces a benchmark analysis of ANSPs. They publish 
reports which monitor performance and targets for improvements, including the annual Air Traffic 
Management Cost Effectiveness (ACE) benchmarking report which mainly compares ANSPs on 
financial and economic gate-to-gate key performance indicators. Besides these reports, 
EUROCONTROL performance review unit (PRU) commission studies on the efficiency of air 
navigation systems such as those by Mouchart and Simar (2003), NERA Economic Consulting (2006) 
and Competition Economists Group (2011). Mouchart and Simar (2003), focus on the technical 
efficiency of European air control centres (i.e. the regional centres composing the ANSPs) applying a 
non-parametric methodology. The main conclusions of the report are that the efficiency of the Centres 
are similar to the year 2000 and that the delay variable has a significant effect on the individual 
inefficiencies. Finally, the authors argue that the returns-to-scale in the production process of the 
Centres are characterised by increasing or near constant returns-to-scale for small units and decreasing 
returns-to-scale for larger Centres. NERA (2006) and the Competition Economists Group (2011) are, 
to the best of our knowledge, the only two works estimating European ANSPs cost efficiency using a 
stochastic frontier approach. NERA (2006) compared the cost efficiency of 34 ANSPs between 2001 
and 2004 using a Cobb Douglas functional form, however the results were considered to be poor 
given the insufficient number of observations and no major conclusions were drawn. Similarly, the 
Competition Economists Group (2011) assessed ANSP cost-efficiency extending the previous work 
by NERA. The report analysed the cost efficiency of ANSPs for the period 2002-2009 applying a 
Cobb Douglas total cost stochastic frontier analysis. Despite problems of estimation convergence, the 
report shows an average level of inefficiency ranging from 13% to 60%, as a function of the 
assumption with respect to the inefficiency distribution. Besides these works, few other researchers 
benchmarked European ANSPs applying a data envelopment approach (e.g., Button and Neiva, 2014, 
Bilotkach et al., 2015).  Generally, no research has been undertaken in order to connect ownership and 
efficiency by showing the influence that ownership and institutional structure has upon ANSP (cost) 
efficiency. The aim of this research is to fill this gap in the literature. By adopting a stochastic frontier 
approach, we evaluate the impact of ownership over the ANSPs cost structures and cost efficiencies. 
We estimate the cost functions (total cost and variable cost) within a Bayesian framework in order to 
incorporate regularity conditions following the economics theory. By satisfying the economics 
regularity assumptions, our estimates are therefore providing useful information to the regulator in 
regards to industry elasticities and economies of scale.  
 
                                            
1
 Notice that EUROCONTROL includes as members some non-EU countries (e.g. Armenia, Albania, 
Ukraine, etc.)  
 
 
1.1  European ANSPs  
ANS within Europe are coordinated and integrated by EUROCONTROL. EUROCONTROL aims to 
facilitate the establishment of a Single European Sky (SES), a European Union initiative looking to 
address issues facing the European ATM system including increasing traffic levels, high costs of 
ANSP services, heterogeneous working practices and constraints of air route networks. Although a 
controversial concept, with possibilities of workforce redundancies, the SES looks to restructure and 
defragment the European airspace to enhance capacity and enable a more efficient air navigation 
system. The SES has introduced the concept of Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs) with the intent to 
increase cooperation and integration of ANS provision amongst ANSPs, or, in cases, through an 
integrated provider. This concept aims to reorganise the current airspace blocks across Europe which 
are established according to national boundaries into nine functional airspace blocks, thereby 
defragmenting the European airspace. The SES legislative package most notably Regulation EC No. 
(1070/2009) defines FABs as an airspace block which is developed in accordance with operational 
requirements irrespective of national boundaries enabling the provision of ANS and associated 
functions to be performance-driven and optimised. Moreover, SES has resulted in the European 
Commission deciding on common regulatory approaches and they oversee implementation at national 
level, with a focus on performance regulations to stimulate ANSP cost-efficiency and service quality. 
As an example, prior to 2012 the ANSP charges were regulated under full cost-recovery mechanisms 
resulting in increased charges following any revenue shortfalls and with any profits redistributed to 
the airspace users (European Commission, 2010). In accordance with the more recent regulation 
1191/2010, ANSPs are now not guaranteed to cover their costs and they have incentives to be 
efficient given the possibility of retaining profits. However, despite being directed by rules and 
business pressures prescribed by EUROCONTROL, ANSPs within Europe still differ significantly. 
Each ANSP has duties mandated by laws unique to them, with governments providing different 
definitions and responsibilities of their respective ANSPs. Almost all ANSPs are engaged in both core 
and non-core business activities, however, the extent to which varies across each ANSP. 
1.2 ANSPs Privatisation and Commercialisation 
It is possible to recognise three main ANSP ownership and institutional structures: state entities, 
commercialised organisations and privatised organisations. State entities are those which are 
considered a governmental department. Commercialised organisations can vary in type, for example, 
they can operate as an autonomous public sector entity, or may be a fully government owned entity 
which operates under private laws. Privatised organisations are those which have shares which are 
majority held by non-government companies such as stakeholders and private parties. Generally, 
 
privatisation can be defined as the change in ownership from government/state-owned to private 
ownership while commercialisation can be defined as a process in which the management style of an 
organisation is assessed and re-organised to ensure it is efficient, productive and profitable. The 
commercialisation of ANSPs originated in New Zealand in 1987, who created a state-owned 
enterprise paying dividends to the state. Australia then followed suit, and later, Canada who privatised 
their ANSP, NAV CANADA. Since, numerous ANSPs world-wide have become commercialised, 
most of which becoming 100% state-owned corporations without profit-maximising goals. An 
exception to this is the UK’s ANSP, NATS, which in 2001 became the first for-profit ANSP, 
operating under a public-private partnership. European ANS showed a trend towards 
commercialisation and government independence, with numerous European ANSPs considering 
themselves explicit commercial businesses seeking commercial opportunities. Privatisation and 
commercialisation look to improve efficiencies through the introduction of competitive behaviours 
within the environment. It has been argued that there is no potential for competition within the ATC 
environment due to its dependence upon infrastructure and reasons of national interest. However, 
arguably, given the open trading market within Europe, competition for the market does exist, such as 
the 2014 bid between NATS (UK) and DFS (Germany) ANSPs for the management of ATC services 
at Gatwick Airport, which was awarded to Germany’s DFS. Commercial revenues could improve en-
route service unit rates. As such, increased competition coupled with a commercial drive should result 
in reduced user fees in accordance with the cost-efficiency targets set by the European Commission. 
Another reason which identified the need for ownership reform was recognition that there was a direct 
conflict between the needs of ATC customers, politicians, industry and lobbies. Commercialisation is 
recognised by many advocates as a powerful catalyst for promoting collaboration between airspace 
users. Furthermore, it was considered necessary to separate service provision from economic and 
safety regulation as state civil aviation authorities were often regulating their competitors (Majumdar, 
1995). A prime reason to move towards an ANSP entity separated from the government is to free the 
organisation from government funding and management constraints, enabling the required high levels 
of investment for the inherent technological dependency of ANSPs and to ensure that growing traffic 
levels can be safely controlled without resultant delays (Majumdar, 1995). Theoretically, a privatised 
entity would be financially self-sufficient and would have the potential to reduce service disruptions 
stemming from financial constraints and budget limitations. Suggested drawbacks of privatisation and 
commercialisation include the imposing of greater costs for airspace users, increased technological 
faults and disruptive labour disputes. However, it may be argued that privatisation cannot improve 
efficiencies and that profit-making incentives may contradict high levels of safety and security. The 
cost reductions resulting from ANSP privatisation (if any) may come at a detriment to other 
operational and organisational aspects. Monopolistic, revenue-driven entities tend to have little 
incentive to ensure fees are kept as low as possible whilst the labour-intensive nature of ANSPs 
 
contradicts the minimisation strategy of privatisation to keep costs low, as safety levels are the highest 
priority and reductions in workforce may implicate safety levels. Another problem related to the 
market characteristics can be depicted from the classic study by Vickers and Yarrow (1991). The 
authors suggest that private ownership has efficiency advantages only under competitive conditions, 
while ownership (whether private or public) in context of high market power is almost irrelevant. 
Indeed, in the case of natural monopolies (or geographical monopolies as for ANSPs), the only factor 
that appears to be relevant to impact efficiencies is the regulatory policy framework. Another 
significant problem in the trend towards privatisation and commercialisation is the political will of 
governments to allow independence of the ANSP. Governments are concerned about losing revenue 
and political influence that it can levy over ANS provision. An argument against privatisation and 
commercialisation is that government owned and controlled ANSP services allow budgets to be 
managed more simply, furthermore, the absence of commercial pressures ensures the removal of 
distraction from the core services. As a public service, significant ATC service failures would be 
catastrophic to respective countries. As such despite handing operational responsibility, assets and 
infrastructure to external parties, governments with privatised ANSPs still assume costs and ultimate 
responsibility to ensure continuous service. 
 
2. Methodology 
In order to study the impact of ownership on cost it is necessary to firstly define the ANSP’s cost 
functions. Given the high variability of air traffic growth, ANSPs are constantly exposed to 
unanticipated traffic changes. Even if ANSPs are able to adjust inputs (at least to a certain degree) by 
accelerating or decelerating staff training and recruitment, this may not be valid when managing 
airspace capacity. During periods of low demand, it is not practical or sensible for ANSPs to cut 
capacity in order to save costs while, on the contrary, capacity enhancements are generally managed 
by long-term, capital intensive projects. Equation (1) describes a variable cost approach assuming the 
inability to fully adjust the input mix in the short run hence considering the capital as a quasi-fixed 
variable: 
𝑉𝐶 =  𝑓(𝑊, 𝑌, 𝐾, 𝑍)      (1) 
where the variable costs (VC) are a function of the set of input prices (W), the outputs (Y), the capital 
stock (K) and a set of variables capturing the heterogeneity of the ANSPs (Z). Equation (1) by 
construction is only analysing the variable costs hence describing the cost of operating the capacity 
and the amount of capacity provided. By estimating a total cost function equation (2) it is possible to 
include the cost of supplying the capacity, hence providing a more complete analysis. The total cost 
approach in the most used within ANSP cost analysis, thereby assuming that the quantities of the 
 
inputs are freely available and under the control of the ANSPs (NERA, 2006, Competition Analysis 
Group, 2012 and Bilotkach et al., 2015). 
𝑇𝐶 =  𝑓(𝑊, 𝑌, 𝑍)      (2) 
The total costs (TC) are a function of a set of input prices including the price for the capital (W), the 
outputs (Y) and a set of set of variables controlling for heterogeneity (Z). We estimate the cost 
function (1) and (2) within a stochastic frontier framework, hence including inefficiencies as 
deviations from the optimal cost minimiser function:  
𝑉𝐶 =  𝑓(𝑊, 𝑌, 𝐾, 𝑍) + 𝑣 + 𝑢      (3𝑎) 
𝑇𝐶 =  𝑓(𝑊, 𝑌, 𝑍) + 𝑣 + 𝑢            (3𝑏) 
Where, 𝑢 represents the  deviation from the theoretical cost function due to inefficiency and 𝑣 is the 
estimation random error. Due to its flexibility, we apply a translog as the function form (𝑓) (in order 
to compare the results with the existing studies, in Appendix B we provide the results when using a 
Cobb-Douglas function). In order to evaluate the impact of ownership on the ANSP costs, we use two 
approaches. Ownership structure (and environmental variables) can influence (i) the cost function or 
(ii) the units’ efficiency. In the former case, the environmental variables are included in the right-hand 
side of the equation hence following the standard stochastic frontier approach considering 𝐼 ANSPs 
(𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼) and 𝑇 periods (𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇) which can be defined for the variable cost function as:  
 𝑉𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑌𝑖𝑡 , 𝑊𝑖𝑡 , 𝐾𝑖𝑡; 𝛽)+ ∑ 𝜃𝑗
𝑀
𝑗
𝑧𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏1𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏2𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,     (4𝑎) 
and for the total cost function as: 
 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑌𝑖𝑡 , 𝑊𝑖𝑡; 𝛽)+ ∑ 𝜃𝑗
𝑀
𝑗
𝑧𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏1𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜏2𝑡𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,     (4𝑏) 
Where, the output (Y), the set of input prices (W) and the capital (K) are considered in the function 
parameterisation, the environmental variables (𝑧𝑗) are considered in a log linear fashion while the time 
trend 𝑡 in a neutral non-linear way. The term 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the common error component independently and 
identically distributed as 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2), while 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the time varying inefficiency term estimated as 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝜂(𝑡 − 𝑇)) ∗ 𝑢𝑖 (Battese and Coelli, 1992) with 𝑢𝑖~𝐸𝑥𝑝(𝜆). When the ownership structures 
are deemed to influence the units’ efficiency, it is possible to implement the approach proposed by 
Koop et al. (1997). More precisely, it is possible to estimate equations (4a) and (4b) by assuming the 
covariates (𝑧𝑗) to affect the posterior mean of the inefficiency term distribution as: 
𝑢𝑖~𝐸𝑥𝑝 (𝑒𝑥𝑝 {∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑧𝑗,𝑖.
𝑀
𝑗
})      (5) 
 
Estimating equations (4a and 4b) it is possible to analyse the impact of the ownership on the ANSP 
cost structures. Estimating the inefficiencies as in equation (5), it is possible to analyse the direct 
impact of ownership on the cost efficiencies (i.e. including the ownership variables in the inefficiency 
distribution).
2
 Both in the case of equations (4) and (5), the environmental variables do not interact 
with the inputs or the time. Therefore, frontier shape, input-output and substitution elasticities are not 
influenced by the environment. In order to be consistent with the economics theory and to provide 
reliable estimations, the cost function needs to satisfy the property of non-negativity in costs, 
homogeneity, monotonicity in output and input prices and concavity. The homogeneity condition can 
be implemented by simply normalising the input prices and the variable costs by one of the input 
prices, while monotonicity and concavity are more difficult to impose. The most common approach is 
to estimate the model without imposing these two conditions only assessing the severity of the 
constraints violations; however, this practice could lead to distorted parameter estimates (e.g. as 
shown in Chua et al., 2005). Different viable implementation alternatives are indicated in literature 
(some examples include Ryan and Wales, 1998 and 2000), in our work we use the accept/reject 
algorithm proposed by Terrell (1996). The method locally imposes monotonicity and concavity by 
assigning zero weights to the parameter vectors leading to monotonicity and concavity violations. The 
estimations of equations (4) and (5) implement the Terrell algorithm by employing a Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) method (Gibbs Sampler) in a Bayesian framework. Indeed, one of the 
advantages of applying Bayesian estimation for the stochastic frontier methods is the easy 
incorporation of regularity conditions. Other advantages of stochastic Bayesian approach comprehend 
the exact inference on the inefficiencies and the formal treatment of parameters and model 
uncertainties (van den Broeck et al.,1994 and Coelli et al., 2006,  Griffin and Steel, 2007).
3
 
3. Data 
Data are extracted from EUROCONTROL annual ATM Cost-Effectiveness (ACE) Benchmarking 
reports, which consist of technical and economic information provided by each ANSP. The data used 
within this study includes civil air traffic management/ communications, navigation and surveillance 
(ATM/CNS) related gate-to-gate costs. The datasets excludes costs, inputs and outputs associated 
with ATM service provision for military aviation. The data set includes information for 37 European 
ANSPs for 2006 to 2014.
4
 Data prior to 2006 are not consistent in the traffic complexity measure and 
therefore are not considered.  
                                            
2
 We estimated the function applying different efficiency distributions (i.e. normal distribution and 
truncated normal distribution). In our case, the exponential distribution was the best performing, 
specifically when considering estimations convergence. 
3
 For a formal description of the Bayesian estimation process we refer the reader to van den Broeck et 
al., (1994) and Koop et al. (1997). With respect to the technical implementation of the Terrell 
algorithm we reference Griffin and Steel (2007). 
4
 Data for Armenia ANSP are available from 2009. 
 
As total costs (TC) we use the ATM/CNS provision costs, while as variable costs (VC) the ATM/CNS 
provision costs less the depreciation costs and the cost of capital. Using data related to ATM/CNS, we 
focus our study on ANSPs regulated activities. We consider a unique output (Y) computed as the 
composite flight hours controlled. This measure is a weighted sum of en-route flight hours controlled 
and the number of instrumental flight rule airport movements controlled and it is commonly used in 
ANSPs benchmarking. The input price vector includes the price for air traffic controllers ATCOs 
(W1), the price for non-operational staff (W2), and the price for non-staff operating inputs (W3). W1 
and W2 are computed as the relative costs divided by the relative full time equivalent (FTE) numbers. 
The non-staff operating input is a “catch all costs” category, including energy, spare parts, 
communications, contracted services etc., hence as W3, we consider the consumer price index at 
country level sourced from the World Bank. As in the previous literature (e.g. Scotti and Volta 2017, 
Oum and Yu 1998), the inclusion of a price index captures the standard inputs price heterogeneities 
between countries. When estimating the variable cost function (equation 3a), as quasi-fixed capital 
(K) we use the capital net book value for the fixed assets in operation. K considers capital inputs used 
in ATM/CNS such as buildings, controller working environment and positions, ATM equipment, and 
CNS infrastructure.
5
 In the total cost function (equation 3b) we compute the capital related input price 
(W4) as in Competition Economists Group (2011) (i.e. following the suggestion of the 
EUROCONTROL performance review unit). More precisely, W4 is computed as the sum of 
depreciation costs and the cost of capital divided by the net book value in operation adjusted by the 
annual producer price index.
6
 
We include a vector of exogenous variables developed by EUROCONTROL describing the total area 
controlled by the ANSP (Z1), the airspace complexity (Z2) and the traffic variability (Z3). The area 
controlled captures the network characteristics and can be used to compute economies of scale. The 
airspace complexity (composed by the adjusted density and the structural complexity) and the traffic 
variability (computed as traffic at the peak week divided by the traffic in the average week) are used 
to control traffic characteristics.
7
 Finally, a set of dummy variables representing the ownership 
structures of the ANSPs are added to study the effect of ownership; private (D1), commercialised 
(omitted), and public (D3). Ownership structures are drawn from the ACE Benchmarking reports. D1 
and D3 are firstly included as cost shifters (as per Equation 3) and then as efficiency modifiers (as per 
Equation 4). Cyprus (DCAC), France (DSNA), Greece (HCCA) and Turkey (DHMI) are considered 
as ANSPs operating under public ownership (i.e. state bodies or autonomous state companies) while 
Maastricht Upper Area Control (MUAC), Switzerland (Skyguide) and The United Kingdom (NATS) 
                                            
5
 The net book value provided by EUROCONTROL is reported by each of the ANPSs and could be 
affected by inconsistencies due to the different depreciation rules between countries. 
6
 In our study we used the producer price index sourced from Eurostat. 
7
 Detailed information regarding the metrics can be found in the report “complexity metrics for ANSP 
benchmarking analysis” (2006). 
 
are considered as private (international or partly private companies). All the remaining European 
ANSPs are deemed as commercialised. The complete list of ANSPs considered and their relative 
ownership form is shown in Appendix A. 
Monetary values (i.e. VC, W1, W2, W4 and K) are adjusted by purchasing power parity (PPP) 
indicators to enable comparisons across countries. In total we consider a slightly unbalanced dataset 
of 330 observations over nine years. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the sample in the last 
year under observation (2014). 
 
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics (2014 data) 
Variable Mean SD Maximum Minimum 
VC – Variable Costs (,000 €)  196,011   233,960   954,784   11,573  
 TC - Total Costs (,000 €)  240,934  289,069  1,100,925  16,661  
W1 -  Price of ATCOs staff (,000 €)  152   57   268   32  
W2 – Price of non-ATCOs staff(,000 €)  79   32   171   16  
W3 – Materials Price (index)  110   7   136   99  
 W4 - Price of Capital (index) 0.35  0.21  1.09  0.11  
Y – Composite flight hours (,000)  503,736   621   2,639,898   18,273  
K – Capital (,000 €)  207,799   269,539   1,036,882   15,688  
Z1 – Area controlled (km^2) 354,278 431,946 2,190,000 20,400 
Z2 – Airspace Complexity (index) 5.02 3.28 12.30 0.81 
Z3 – Traffic Variability (index) 1.31 0.16 1.71 1.11 
 
Figure 1a presents the change of the average variable cost (VC), total cost (TC) and composite flight 
hours (Y), with respect to 2006. Both VC and TC show a similar trend, constantly increasing during 
the period. Average variable costs increased from 167 M to 196 M (+16%) while total costs increased 
from 212 M to 240 M (+13%). The two cost variables show a similar pattern and magnitude with the 
composite flight hours for 2007 and 2008. However, with the end of the financial crisis the cost 
variables had a stronger growth while the average output only slightly increased reaching a +5% rise 
at the end of the period, below the pre-crisis level. Figure 1b presents the changes in prices (W1, W2, 
W3 and W4) and capital (K). Generally, the five variables increased since 2006, with exception of 
capital price and capital stock remaining similar over the period lower than the increase seen in price 
of ATCOs (W1: +33%) and price of non-ATCO staff and material prices (W2, W3: +25). W4 shows a 
10% increase over the period with a significant fall from 2011 to 2012, as a result of relatively big 
increases in NBV values in some ANSPs (NBV appears in the denominator of W4 equation).
8
 
However, due to the relatively small magnitude of these NBV this effect is negligible when analysing 
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 For examples, the NBV of Albania changes from 29M to 40M of euros, the NBV of Armenia from 
5M to 9M, while in Estonia from 10M to 18M.  
 
the capital variable (K). Finally, Figure 1c presents the average increase of composite hours in relation 
to the average change in traffic characteristics (i.e. complexity and variability). Generally, variability 
index shows a small change during the period (+4%) in line with the change in composite flight hours 
(+5%). The average complexity shows a greater increase during the period (+18%). 
 
Figure 1a – Average changes in VC, TC and output with respect to 2006 
Figure 1b – Average changes in prices and capital stock with respect to 2006 
 Figure 1c – Average changes in Y, Complexity and Variability with respect to 2006 
 
4. Results  
We estimate specifications 4 and 5 (i.e. ownership variables considered in the cost structure and 
ownership variables considered in the inefficiency distribution) to the variable cost and total cost 
functions. Results are provided for the translog functional forms (Appendix B shows the results when 
using a Cobb-Douglas function). All the estimates are obtained using a Bayesian approach. Prior 
distributions for the parameters are introduced following Griffin and Steel (2004) and (2007). Results 
are based on 100,000 draws with a thinning to every fifth draw after a burn-in of 50,000 iterations. 
The non-staff operating price (W3) is used as a normalisation variable to implement homogeneity. All 
of the variables (except for the dummies and the time trend) are mean corrected prior to the 
estimation, thus the elasticities of cost with respect to the factor prices are equivalent to shares in costs 
at the average observation.  
Table 2 shows the variable cost function estimated parameters (i.e. posterior mean), the standard 
deviation and the 95% confidence interval for the two specifications (specification 4a and 
specification 5, respectively). The estimates for an additional 50,000 draws (Appendix C) and the 
posterior densities (obtainable upon request to the authors) show the estimations convergence.  
Table 2 – Variable cost function (VC) estimates 
 
Model 4VC Model 5VC 
Variable Mean sd 2.50% 97.50% Mean sd 2.50% 97.50% 
Intercept -1.286 0.138 -1.586 -1.272 -1.166 0.097 -1.379 -0.991 
W1 - ATCOs 0.364 0.033 0.300 0.364 0.372 0.033 0.307 0.438 
 
W2 – Non-ATCOs 0.420 0.032 0.359 0.419 0.410 0.032 0.348 0.472 
Y - Output 0.259 0.064 0.131 0.261 0.254 0.062 0.129 0.373 
K - Capital 0.045 0.017 0.013 0.045 0.036 0.016 0.004 0.068 
W1*W1 0.180 0.049 0.084 0.180 0.198 0.050 0.100 0.296 
W2*W2 0.144 0.026 0.092 0.144 0.139 0.027 0.086 0.191 
Y*Y 0.007 0.024 -0.040 0.007 -0.004 0.022 -0.046 0.040 
K*K -0.003 0.011 -0.024 -0.003 -0.005 0.011 -0.026 0.016 
W1*W2 -0.379 0.078 -0.532 -0.379 -0.380 0.077 -0.529 -0.229 
W1*Y 0.065 0.040 -0.010 0.064 0.064 0.040 -0.017 0.140 
W1*K 0.063 0.039 -0.015 0.063 0.054 0.040 -0.022 0.134 
W2*Y 0.001 0.047 -0.091 0.002 -0.011 0.046 -0.100 0.080 
W2*K -0.050 0.039 -0.128 -0.050 -0.033 0.040 -0.111 0.045 
Y*K -0.001 0.019 -0.036 -0.001 -0.006 0.018 -0.041 0.030 
t - Time 0.021 0.009 0.005 0.021 0.008 0.007 -0.006 0.023 
t*t -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.000 
Z1 - Area 0.270 0.116 -0.050 0.289 0.358 0.096 0.174 0.560 
Z2 - Complexity 0.010 0.024 -0.037 0.010 0.008 0.025 -0.041 0.058 
Z3 - Variability 0.228 0.193 -0.152 0.227 0.140 0.196 -0.250 0.531 
D1 - Private 0.352 0.267 -0.279 0.367     
D2 - Public 0.314 0.176 -0.080 0.328     
 
        
Intercept     -0.134 0.198 -0.536 0.239 
D1 - Private     -0.304 0.656 -1.749 0.825 
D2 - Public     -0.318 0.572 -1.548 0.695 
         
Eta (𝛈) -0.009 0.003 -0.016 -0.003     
         
Sigma sq. u 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.006 
Lambda9 0.936 0.180 0.624 1.325 0.892 0.175 0.585 1.269 
DIC 4725  4732   
 
The two models show a relatively low lambda hence a relatively high inefficiency variance. This 
implies that a large part of the deviations from the cost minimising function is due to inefficiency and 
that the choice of a stochastic frontier approach is correct. The average estimated efficiency for the 
industry is relatively low, 38% - for Model 4VC, 37% - for Model 5VC. Comparing the two models, 
the estimates are similar and showing the expected signs with most of the cross and second order 
estimated coefficients being statistically significant. When computing the deviance information 
criterion (DIC), Model 4VC shows a slightly lower DIC value being the best-fit model for the ANSPs 
data. The differences between the results are mainly explained by the way in which the ownership 
variables are introduced in the analysis.  
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 In Model 5VC, Lambda 2 and Lambda 3 (i.e. D1=1 and D2=1, respectively) are 0.775 and 0.732. 
 
Analysing Model 4VC results, at the sample mean the ATCOs labour (W1) accounts for 36% of 
variable costs, non-operational labour (W2) accounts for 42%, and materials (W3) represents the 
remaining 22%. Similar results can be depicted in Model 5VC with W1 accounting for 37% of 
variable costs, W2 for 41%, and W3 for 22%. An increase of 1% of the output (Y) implies an increase 
of around 0.26% of variable costs in both models. The time parameters (𝑡 and 𝑡 ∗ 𝑡) both show weak 
significance, suggesting that the variable costs are possibly increasing at a decreasing rate during the 
period analysed, ceteris paribus. Moreover, the results suggest that the traffic characteristics (Z2 – 
Complexity and Z3 - Variability) are positive albeit not statistically significant while the Area (Z1) 
has a positive and significant impact on variable costs. Model 4VC provides a negative eta (𝜂) 
highlighting that ANSPs have slightly improved their variable cost-efficiencies over the period 
analysed. The ownership variables are not significant neither in Model 4VC nor in Model 5VC. Our 
results show that the ownership structure is not impacting the European ANSP variable cost function 
(4VC) and the cost-efficiencies (5VC). Finally, the Bayesian framework allows the evaluation of the 
kernel density estimates of the posterior distributions of the economies of scale at the sample mean. 
Economies of scale are computed as 1/[εY + εZ1], where εY is the output elasticity and εZ1 is the 
controlled area elasticity, respectively (Figure 2). Both models show the presence of economies of 
scale with the estimates significantly distributed above the unit, on average an increase of 1% in the 
composite flight hours and area controlled may lead to a less than proportional estimated increase in 
variable costs of 0.60% (Model 4VC) and 0.54% (Model 5VC). 
 
 Mean sd 2.50% 97.50% 
Scale - Model 4VC 1.871 0.356 1.374 2.776 
Scale - Model 5VC 1.691 0.349 1.245 2.547 
 
Figure 2 – Kernel density of estimated economies of scale (variable cost models) 
Table 3 shows the total cost function estimated parameters (i.e. posterior mean), the standard 
deviation and the 95% confidence interval for the two specifications (equation 4b and equation 5, 
respectively). For consistency, as for the previous estimations the following was considered; i) we use 
the same prior distributions for the parameters, ii) estimates are based on 100,000 iterations with a 
thinning of 5 with a burn-in of 50,000 iterations, and iii) we use W3 as normalisation variable. 
Table 3 – Total cost function (TC) estimates 
 
Model 4TC Model 5TC 
Variable Mean sd 2.50% 97.50% Mean sd 2.50% 97.50% 
Intercept -1.351 0.107 -1.564 -1.139 -1.28 0.103 -1.487 -1.083 
W1 - ATCOs 0.384 0.033 0.319 0.449 0.389 0.034 0.321 0.456 
W2 – Non-ATCOs 0.361 0.032 0.297 0.423 0.358 0.032 0.295 0.421 
W4 - Capital price 0.181 0.062 0.063 0.305 0.200 0.063 0.076 0.322 
Y - Output 0.045 0.018 0.010 0.079 0.046 0.017 0.012 0.08 
W1*W1 0.063 0.049 -0.033 0.16 0.067 0.051 -0.031 0.168 
W2*W2 0.125 0.03 0.066 0.185 0.123 0.031 0.062 0.184 
W4*W4 -0.011 0.019 -0.047 0.026 -0.019 0.018 -0.053 0.016 
Y*Y 0.027 0.007 0.014 0.041 0.027 0.007 0.014 0.040 
W1*W2 -0.243 0.077 -0.394 -0.092 -0.247 0.081 -0.405 -0.091 
W1*W4 0.135 0.034 0.068 0.199 0.136 0.033 0.072 0.203 
W1*Y -0.055 0.042 -0.138 0.027 -0.066 0.042 -0.149 0.017 
W2*W4 -0.065 0.033 -0.131 -0.001 -0.061 0.033 -0.127 0.004 
W2*Y -0.006 0.03 -0.064 0.052 -0.005 0.03 -0.064 0.054 
W4*Y 0.041 0.015 0.011 0.07 0.041 0.015 0.011 0.070 
t - Time 0.000 0.009 -0.018 0.017 -0.006 0.007 -0.021 0.008 
t*t -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
Z1 - Area 0.305 0.097 0.145 0.52 0.273 0.1 0.079 0.488 
Z2 - Complexity 0.028 0.024 -0.019 0.074 0.026 0.024 -0.02 0.073 
Z3 - Variability 0.109 0.189 -0.258 0.479 0.117 0.189 -0.255 0.489 
D1 - Private 0.243 0.497 -1.226 0.814     
D2 - Public 0.215 0.394 -1.049 0.594     
 
        
Intercept     -0.245 0.196 -0.641 0.126 
D1 - Private     -0.378 0.660 -1.824 0.756 
D2 - Public     -0.424 0.571 -1.647 0.590 
         
Eta (𝛈) -0.003 0.003 -0.008 0.002     
         
Sigma sq. u 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.004 
Lambda10 0.782 0.140 0.535 1.083 0.798 0.155 0.527 1.134 
DIC 4717   4719  
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 In Model 5TC, Lambda 2 and Lambda 3 (i.e. D1=1 and D2=1, respectively) are 0.644 and 0.588. 
 
 
Most of the comments of table 2 are valid for the total cost function results. The models show a 
relatively low lambda hence a moderately high inefficiency variance, the estimates are similar and 
show the expected signs. The average estimated efficiency for the industry is still relatively low, 
around 33% for both the models. In Model 4TC, at the sample mean the ATCOs labour (W1) 
accounts for 38% of total costs, non-operational labour (W2) accounts for 36%, capital (W4) accounts 
for 18% and materials (W3) represents the remaining 8%. Similar results can be depicted in Model 
5TC with the only small difference in W4 (20%) and consequently in W3 (6%).  Shares in costs are 
similar to those obtained by the Competition Analysis Group (2012) (our estimates are slightly higher 
in the labour variable) and substantially different from the estimates of NERA (2006) (mainly in the 
non-ATCOs share which is accounting for almost 50% of total costs).
11
 An increase of 1% of the 
output (Y) implies an increase of around 0.05 % of total costs in both models 4TC and 5TC (almost 
five times less than the impact on variable costs). The time parameters (𝑡 and 𝑡 ∗ 𝑡) show weak 
significance, suggesting that the total costs are not changing during the period analysed, ceteris 
paribus. The estimate of eta (𝜂) shows a non significant improvement in the total cost efficiencies. As 
for the variable cost estimates, complexity (Z2) and variability (Z3) are not significant, while an 
increase in the area controlled (Z1) increases the total costs (we notice that these results are shared 
with previous studies, despite the differences in period analysed). A possible explanation for 
complexity and variability not baring significance may result from these two variables by nature 
concerning themselves with only en-route stages of flight, whereas this study concerns itself with 
gate-to-gate costs. Even when considering long-term cost functions, the ownership variables are not 
significant either as determinants of the cost structure or as cost-efficiency explanatories. Figure 3 
shows the kernel distribution for the posterior densities of the economies of scale at the sample mean. 
Results show the average ANSP lying on the increasing economies of scales part of the technology, 
an increase of 1% in composite flight hours and Area controlled may lead to a less than proportional 
increase of 0.46% (Model 4TC) and 0.48% (Model 5TC) in total costs.  
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 The estimates differ in the methodological approach, the functional form and, most importantly, in 
the years analysed. 
  
 Mean sd 2.50% 97.50% 
Scale - Model 4TC 2.172 0.529 1.428 3.412 
Scale - Model 5TC 2.264 0.655 1.245 2.547 
Figure 3 – Kernel density of estimated economies of scale (total cost models) 
5) Discussion 
The estimated models show that the ownership structures do not impact neither the cost structure nor 
the cost efficiency of European ANSPs. These results are in line with the work of Vickers and Yarrow 
(1991), which showed that regulation is more important than privatisation to achieve efficiencies 
within a monopolistic context. In the specific case of ANSPS, there are numerous reasons which 
provide possible explanations to these findings. Generally, all ANSPs must operate in accordance 
with common regulations and frameworks such as those determined by EURCONTROL. Given the 
environment within which the European ANSPs must operate such as the SES (which already looks to 
ensure cost-efficiencies despite the ownership structure), it is arguably difficult for private sector 
employees to further enhance the ANSPs’ cost efficiencies or in general to reduce costs. Irrespective 
of ownership, all ANSPs must ensure safety as the top priority, therefore they are strictly regulated 
and cannot reduce head count of ATCOs or technology levels (the two most expensive factors). 
Another possible explanation is that whilst having secured a degree of autonomy from their respective 
governments, behaviours are culturally driven and despite ANSPs being commercialised, they often 
still function in practical terms as a public entity (i.e. 100% government owned and operating under 
government control). For example, in some countries the staff in the ANSP often switch between the 
ANSP and the regulator (e.g. Romania), whilst the CEO of the Irish ANSP, IAA, is both head of the 
Civil Aviation Authority and the ANSP simultaneously. This could therefore create difficulties in 
 
ascertaining the direct influence of ownership and institutional structures on costs and cost-
efficiencies. Finally, around 81% of the ANSPs included within the study were categorised as 
commercialised. Given that Commercialised ANSPs are government owned but have a level of 
autonomy, there is not a clear definition between the outcomes of differing ownership models as 
commercialised is a sort of amalgamation of different structures. Whilst commercialised ANSPs are 
more remote from the government than those falling within the ‘public’ classification, they can still 
benefit from many of the advantages of being government owned, such as the ability to utilise cheaper 
government resources for procurement and facilities whilst also being open to the ability to utilise 
private sector contractors. The unbalanced number of observations deemed as commercialised may, as 
well, create a problem in statistically identifying differences. However, we note that if a real 
difference exists, the coefficients should reflect it at least with a low significance level. 
Another significant indication obtained from the estimations is that the average European ANSP is 
lying on the increasing return to scale part of the technology. Our results suggest that the industry has 
the possibility of decreasing costs by agglomerating the ANSPs. When considering the capital as a 
freely available input, the economies of scale are notably bigger than the ones estimated in a fixed-
input environment. Air traffic controllers, support staff and the composite flight hours (and the 
relative costs) are related to each other through safety regulations. When considering variable costs, 
economies of scale are therefore limited given the ATCOs safety constraint in managing traffic 
volumes. However, this relationship between factors does not hold when considering buildings, ATM 
equipment and Communication and Navigation Surveillance infrastructures as freely available inputs. 
Increasing the volume controlled (e.g. by agglomerating the ANSPs) would exploit the large 
economies of scale estimated by the total cost functions. These results have a policy implication 
supporting the initiative of the Single European Sky (SES). Indeed, a major component of the 
initiative is the notion of functional airspace blocks (FAB), which are intended to aggregate several 
providers into larger entities which are expected to handle air traffic as if they were a single ANSP. 
However, despite nine defined FAB entities (regulation No. 549/2004 amended in regulation (EC) 
1070/2009), only two of have been declared established and notified to the European Commission 
(UK-Ireland and Denmark-Sweden). Finally, it is important to note that the underlying assumptions of 
the cost function models are i) the entities cost minimising behaviour and ii) the competitive input 
price markets. Prior to the new ANSPs reform, the ANSPs were operating under a full recovery 
regulation hence facing weak explicit incentives in minimising their costs. This is evident in the low 
level of estimated cost efficiencies. However, it is important to remark that our estimates show that 
inefficiencies are slowly improved over the time despite the implementation of a price cap regulation. 
Moreover, due to continuous labour disputes (95 strikes totalling 223 days of disruption for  between 
2010-2015 in Europe, PWC 2015) labour market prices and costs for certain ANSPs may be higher 
than those in a competitive market (ATCOs gross pay vs national average varies between +220% and 
 
+1493%, CANSO 2015). These two factors may provide an explanation for the low efficiency scores 
estimated by the stochastic frontiers. We notice that this situation is shared with all the works dealing 
with cost efficiency. Indeed, our estimated efficiency averages are in line with the ones provided by 
NERA (2006) and the Competition analysis group (2012). 
Conclusions 
This article has looked to investigate whether the institutional structures of ANSPs have an impact on 
their relative costs (variable and total) or on their cost-efficiencies. In order to do so, this work applied 
a cost stochastic frontier approach to a set of 37 European ANSPs for the period 2006-2014. To 
satisfy the economics regularity conditions we estimated the functions applying Terrell (1996) 
algorithm within a Bayesian framework. Using the estimated functions, we then analysed the industry 
elasticities and returns to scale. Our main results have indicated that ownership and institutional 
structure does not have any influence upon ANSP cost-efficiencies or upon their cost structures. 
Whilst this study uses data for a seemingly large timeframe, between 2006 and 2014, arguably, the 
industry is relatively slow at adapting and as such nine years is possibly not a long enough timeframe 
to discern long-term trends or ascertain the evolution of the industry in regard to the impact that 
ownership and institutional structure has on cost-efficiency and cost-structure. This is particularly 
evidenced through some commercialised ANSPs adapting to their new institutional reforms and still 
behaving as public entities. The creation of boards to manage ANSPs, represent users and 
acknowledge the government’s ultimate responsibilities in regards to ANS delivery is a way in which 
ANSPs can ensure appropriate distributions of responsibilities enabling a clearer definition between 
the entity and the government, reducing ambiguity. Moreover, our results show that the air navigation 
service providers are lying on the increasing part of the technology with the economies of scale 
greater when capital is considered as a freely available input (i.e. in a total cost function framework). 
Our results highlight the importance of increasing the average size of the ANSPs in order to decrease 
the relative costs, hence supporting the agglomeration process proposed in the SES initiative. Future 
research could extend this study to ANSPs worldwide considering a wider range of ownership 
structures. However, potential difficulties (partially already present within the European analysis) may 
be the availability of data due to different accounting rules and exogenous factors measurements (e.g. 
airspace complexity indices). Moreover, the research agenda may be focused on the non-regulated, 
commercially driven aspects of the privatised and commercialised ANSPs. Studies on ANSPs profit 
maximisation behaviours may complete the analysis in regards to the institutional and ownership 
reform.  
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Appendix A – List of ANSPs considered and their relative ownership status 
# ANSP Country Status 
1 Albcontrol Albania Commercialised 
2 ARMATS Armenia Commercialised 
3 Austro Control Austria Commercialised 
4 Belgocontrol Belgium Commercialised 
5 BULATSA Bulgaria Commercialised 
6 Croatia Control Croatia Commercialised 
7 DCAC Cyprus Cyprus Public 
8 ANS CR Czech Republic Commercialised 
9 NAVIAIR Denmark Commercialised 
10 EANS Estonia Commercialised 
11 M-NAV F,Y,R, Macedonia Commercialised 
12 Finavia Finland Commercialised 
13 DSNA France Public 
14 DFS Germany Commercialised 
15 HCAA Greece Public 
16 HungaroControl Hungary Commercialised 
17 IAA Ireland Commercialised 
18 ENAV Italy Commercialised 
19 LGS Latvia Commercialised 
20 Oro Navigacija Lithuania Commercialised 
21 MATS Malta Commercialised 
22 MoldATSA Moldova Commercialised 
23 MUAC MUAC Private 
24 LVNL Netherlands Commercialised 
25 Avinor (Continental) Norway Commercialised 
26 PANSA Poland Commercialised 
27 NAV Portugal (Continental) Portugal Commercialised 
28 ROMATSA Romania Commercialised 
29 SMATSA Serbia and Montenegro Commercialised 
30 LPS Slovak Republic Commercialised 
31 Slovenia Control Slovenia Commercialised 
32 ENAIRE Spain Commercialised 
33 LFV Sweden Commercialised 
34 Skyguide Switzerland Private 
35 DHMI Turkey Public 
36 UkSATSE Ukraine Commercialised 
37 NATS (Continental) United Kingdom Private 
  
 
Appendix B - Cobb-Douglas estimation results based on 100,000 draws with a thinning to every 
fifth draw after a burn-in of 50,000 iterations. 
Variable Costs Models 
 
Model 4VC Model 5VC 
Variable Mean sd 2.50% 97.50% Mean sd 2.50% 97.50% 
Intercept -1.225 0.127 -1.501 -0.999 -1.144 0.091 -1.334 -0.975 
W1 - ATCOs 0.376 0.032 0.313 0.439 0.380 0.032 0.318 0.443 
W2 – Non-ATCOs 0.353 0.028 0.297 0.409 0.348 0.028 0.293 0.403 
Y - Output 0.246 0.066 0.120 0.370 0.256 0.059 0.142 0.370 
K - Capital 0.039 0.014 0.013 0.066 0.034 0.013 0.008 0.060 
t - Time 0.011 0.010 -0.008 0.031 0.003 0.008 -0.013 0.019 
t*t -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.000 
Z1 - Area 0.404 0.106 0.172 0.627 0.475 0.082 0.327 0.650 
Z2 - Complexity 0.003 0.026 -0.049 0.054 0.001 0.026 -0.050 0.053 
Z3 - Variability -0.088 0.202 -0.481 0.314 -0.168 0.197 -0.556 0.215 
D1 - Private 0.283 0.359 -0.602 0.764     
D2 - Public 0.270 0.180 -0.173 0.561     
 
        
Intercept     -0.160 0.195 -0.555 0.209 
D1 - Private     -0.228 0.657 -1.675 0.896 
D2 - Public     -0.172 0.569 -1.397 0.841 
         
Eta (𝛈) -0.006 0.004 -0.013 0.001     
         
Sigma sq. u 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.008 
Lambda 0.908 0.168 0.614 1.269 0.869 0.169 0.574 1.233 
DIC 4764 4784 
In Model 5VC, Lambda 2 and Lambda 3 (i.e. D1=1 and D2=1, respectively) are 0.814 and 0.823. 
Total Costs Models 
 
Model 4TC Model 5TC 
Variable Mean sd 2.50% 97.50% Mean sd 2.50% 97.50% 
Intercept -1.324 0.114 -1.558 -1.116 -1.276 0.103 -1.487 -1.092 
W1 - ATCOs 0.351 0.032 0.287 0.414 0.352 0.031 0.290 0.414 
W2 – Non-ATCOs 0.310 0.029 0.252 0.368 0.306 0.029 0.250 0.363 
W4 - Capital price 0.007 0.015 -0.022 0.036 0.012 0.014 -0.015 0.040 
Y - Output 0.200 0.068 0.071 0.330 0.209 0.062 0.083 0.325 
t - Time -0.005 0.009 -0.022 0.012 -0.011 0.008 -0.027 0.004 
t*t 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
Z1 - Area 0.401 0.128 0.203 0.713 0.392 0.118 0.213 0.672 
Z2 - Complexity 0.011 0.026 -0.041 0.063 0.010 0.026 -0.042 0.062 
Z3 - Variability -0.165 0.198 -0.554 0.221 -0.182 0.197 -0.560 0.210 
D1 - Private 0.304 0.326 -0.503 0.778     
D2 - Public 0.241 0.274 -0.509 0.611     
 
        
 
Intercept     -0.275 0.197 -0.674 0.096 
D1 - Private     -0.308 0.659 -1.747 0.823 
D2 - Public     -0.284 0.574 -1.519 0.738 
         
Eta (𝛈) -0.004 0.003 -0.010 0.001     
         
Sigma sq. u 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.007 
Lambda 0.798 0.145 0.544 1.110 0.775 0.152 0.510 1.101 
 4774 4775 
In Model 5TC, Lambda 2 and Lambda 3 (i.e. D1=1 and D2=1, respectively) are 0.670 and 0.656. 
 
Appendix C – Translog estimation results based on 150,000 draws with a thinning to every fifth 
draw after a burn in of 50,000 iterations. 
Variable Costs Models 
 
Model 4VC Model 5VC 
Variable Mean sd 2.50% 97.50% Mean sd 2.50% 97.50% 
Intercept -1.297 0.132 -1.573 -1.061 -1.169 0.096 -1.376 -0.993 
W1 - ATCOs 0.364 0.033 0.299 0.430 0.372 0.033 0.307 0.438 
W2 – Non-ATCOs 0.420 0.032 0.359 0.482 0.411 0.032 0.349 0.473 
Y - Output 0.251 0.065 0.119 0.378 0.253 0.061 0.130 0.367 
K - Capital 0.046 0.017 0.013 0.078 0.036 0.016 0.004 0.068 
W1*W1 0.181 0.050 0.084 0.279 0.198 0.050 0.100 0.295 
W2*W2 0.145 0.026 0.093 0.197 0.140 0.027 0.087 0.192 
Y*Y 0.008 0.023 -0.037 0.052 -0.004 0.022 -0.047 0.040 
K*K -0.002 0.011 -0.024 0.018 -0.005 0.011 -0.026 0.016 
W1*W2 -0.381 0.078 -0.533 -0.229 -0.380 0.077 -0.529 -0.229 
W1*Y 0.065 0.040 -0.011 0.145 0.064 0.039 -0.014 0.140 
W1*K 0.062 0.039 -0.015 0.140 0.055 0.040 -0.022 0.133 
W2*Y -0.001 0.048 -0.094 0.092 -0.012 0.046 -0.101 0.078 
W2*K -0.049 0.040 -0.128 0.029 -0.032 0.039 -0.109 0.044 
Y*K -0.002 0.019 -0.037 0.035 -0.006 0.018 -0.041 0.029 
t - Time 0.022 0.009 0.005 0.039 0.008 0.007 -0.006 0.023 
t*t -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.000 
Z1 - Area 0.276 0.109 -0.009 0.459 0.350 0.093 0.160 0.545 
Z2 - Complexity 0.011 0.024 -0.036 0.058 0.008 0.025 -0.041 0.057 
Z3 - Variability 0.220 0.193 -0.159 0.602 0.142 0.196 -0.245 0.531 
D1 - Private 0.362 0.260 -0.230 0.822     
D2 - Public 0.315 0.174 -0.077 0.617     
 
        
Intercept     -0.135 0.197 -0.535 0.237 
D1 - Private     -0.309 0.656 -1.749 0.821 
D2 - Public     -0.327 0.572 -1.557 0.688 
         
 
Eta (𝛈) -0.009 0.003 -0.016 -0.003     
         
Sigma sq. u 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.006 
Lambda 0.930 0.177 0.624 1.314 0.891 0.175 0.586 0.878 
In Model 5VC, Lambda 2 and Lambda 3 (i.e. D1=1 and D2=1, respectively) are 0.770 and 0.724. 
Total Costs Models 
 
Model 4TC Model 5TC 
Variable Mean sd 2.50% 97.50% Mean sd 2.50% 97.50% 
Intercept -1.345 0.110 -1.564 -1.131 -1.281 0.099 -1.477 -1.091 
W1 - ATCOs 0.384 0.033 0.319 0.449 0.388 0.034 0.322 0.456 
W2 – Non-ATCOs 0.361 0.032 0.298 0.424 0.358 0.032 0.294 0.421 
W4 - Capital price 0.044 0.018 0.010 0.079 0.046 0.017 0.012 0.080 
Y - Output 0.184 0.063 0.063 0.307 0.199 0.062 0.077 0.318 
W1*W1 0.064 0.049 -0.032 0.161 0.067 0.050 -0.030 0.166 
W2*W2 0.124 0.030 0.066 0.185 0.123 0.030 0.063 0.183 
W4*W4 0.027 0.007 0.014 0.040 0.027 0.007 0.014 0.040 
Y*Y -0.011 0.019 -0.047 0.026 -0.018 0.018 -0.053 0.016 
W1*W2 -0.243 0.077 -0.394 -0.092 -0.248 0.079 -0.400 -0.095 
W1*W4 -0.057 0.042 -0.139 0.025 -0.066 0.042 -0.148 0.016 
W1*Y 0.134 0.034 0.067 0.199 0.136 0.034 0.071 0.203 
W2*W4 -0.005 0.030 -0.064 0.053 -0.005 0.030 -0.064 0.054 
W2*Y -0.064 0.034 -0.130 0.002 -0.062 0.033 -0.128 0.004 
W4*Y 0.041 0.015 0.011 0.070 0.041 0.015 0.011 0.071 
t - Time -0.001 0.009 -0.018 0.017 -0.006 0.007 -0.021 0.009 
t*t -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
Z1 - Area 0.308 0.101 0.137 0.530 0.279 0.096 0.095 0.478 
Z2 - Complexity 0.027 0.024 -0.019 0.074 0.026 0.024 -0.020 0.073 
Z3 - Variability 0.110 0.189 -0.258 0.482 0.113 0.189 -0.260 0.482 
D1 - Private 0.254 0.461 -1.090 0.819     
D2 - Public 0.175 0.439 -1.282 0.595     
 
        
Intercept     -0.246 0.195 -0.642 0.123 
D1 - Private     -0.378 0.659 -1.827 0.757 
D2 - Public     -0.419 0.571 -1.646 0.595 
         
Eta (𝛈) -0.003 0.003 -0.008 0.002     
         
Sigma sq. u 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.006 
Lambda 0.783 0.142 0.534 1.087 0.797 0.155 0.526 1.131 
In Model 5TC, Lambda 2 and Lambda 3 (i.e. D1=1 and D2=1, respectively) are 0.643and 0.589. 
 
 
 
 
